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ABSTRACT

JOSH RANDLE: Leverage and Access: Understanding Why Foreign Countries Lobby
the United States Government
(Under the direction ofTimothy Nordstrom)

The lobbying efforts offoreign states within the United States government
remains one ofthe most prevalent, compelling, and interesting phenomena within the
American political system. Through primarily seeking leverage and access within the
American government,foreign states spend millions of dollars annually to protect thennational interests within the domestic policy realm ofthe United States. To better
understand this increasingly compelling and highly lucrative phenomenon,this thesis
observes and analyzes the actual lobbying disclosures, pursuant to the Federal Agents
Registration Act of 1938, often foreign countries from 1998 to 2010: China, Umted
Kingdom,Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,Peru, Qatar, and Uganda. The countries
are evenly divided into two study groups:those states that possess military alliances or
maintain major economic relationships with the United States and those countries that
lack such politically beneficial relationships. Through understanding the different
relationships the United States employs to interact with other foreign states, and through
analyzing the empirical aspects ofeach country’s disclosed lobbying efforts, patterns in
lobbying efforts emerge. This thesis reveals that countries possessing major pre-existing
relationships with the United States utilize the private lobbying sector far more than those
countries lacking such beneficial relationships, and it further proves that the extent to
which foreign principals understand and participate in this political conundrum is
remarkably fascinating and perpetually evolving.
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I.

Introduction

In the realm of global trade and international relations, states continuously interact
with other sovereign nations to meet national and international goals, to expand
diplomacy, and to maintain stability and prosperity. Fueled primarily by domestic
interests and demands, states continually seek assistance from other states in terms of
satisfying trade deficits, importing foreign goods, assisting with political and military
endeavors, forming alliances and trade agreements, giving and receiving foreign relief
funds, and establishing international credibility and influence. The economic, political,
and military endeavors ofa given country can greatly alter the financial systems and daily
operations of other countries as a direct result of highly intertwined financial systems and
extensive global trade. Therefore, states possess vested interests in the stability and
prosperity oftheir trading partners, military and political allies, and other countries upon
which a state is heavily dependent. The ability of a given state to wield influence within
another state’s national political system in order to satisfy the petitioning country’s
domestic and international goals is a highly prevalent and an increasingly lucrative
phenomenon.
The United States of America stands at the forefront ofinternational trade and
political relations within the international community. With a heavily interconnected
financial system and portfolio of numerous allies, political and military, the United States
government is constantly petitioned by national and international states and corporations
to protect the prosperity and vitality oftheir interests. The right of private interests

and

lobbying coalitions to petition government administrators and elected officials has proven
to be an increasing phenomenon within the American political system.
1

Unlike many states within the international community,the United States is a
highly democratic government, boasting an unparalleled opportunity for citizens,
business, and interests to express their thoughts, concerns, and ideas to government.
Democratic governments are inherently open systems of authority, and the United States
is certainly no exception. In his book. Seven Sins ofAmerican Foreign Policy, author
Loch K. Johnson asserts that the openness democracy allows within American domestic
politics also extends to the nation’s foreign policy proceedings. Johnson writes,“The
debate and openness characteristic ofdomestic policy-making can and must be permitted
for foreign policy, too,”(Johnson 2007, 93). As was the goal ofthe nation’s Founding
Fathers, the federal government is easily accessible to the grassroots level. Members of
the House of Representatives live among and work closely with their constituents,
ensuring every citizen’s voice is heard. Many foreign governments are ruled by the elite,
allowing rare opportunities for interests to be heard, much less the sentiments ofthe
average citizen. As a free and open democratic system, the United States enjoys the
unique experience to petition government and its leaders to protect and better the interests
ofall. The ability to lobby governmental agencies and leaders results directly from the
inherently open natwe ofthe United States’ democratic system of government.
Due to the United States’ desirability as an ally and economic partner, foreign
states constantly compete for attention and favorability with the U.S. government. Like
domestic interests, foreign states exert efforts within the American political system to
maintain diplomatic relations, to encourage

trade and economic ventures, and to protect

their national interests. Lobbying remains one ofthe many effective vehicles through
which foreign governments sustain their connections with the United States.
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Billions of dollars are spent on an annual basis by private corporations, issue
advocacy groups, political organizations, and other lobbying coalitions to wield influence
on critical pieces oflegislation and public policy agendas within the halls of Congress
and in the White House’s administration that potentially bear significant economic or
political effects on the petitioners’ daily operations and business ventures. From 1998 to
2009,the total number of money spent on lobbying efforts within the United States has
proven to continually rise, even as the disclosed number ofregistered lobbyists fluctuates
(ww-ODensecrets-orgy Total lobbying spending peaked in 2009 at $3.46 billion
fwww.opensecrets.orgy [See Table 1]. The numbers found on Table 1 illustrate how
significantly compelling lobbying has become within the United States.
Beyond the endeavors of domestic lobbying interests, however, the presence of
international lobbying efforts from foreign countries and international businesses within
the American political system remains exceptionally prevalent and increasingly
compelling. Year after year, foreign entities continue to spend millions of dollars to
protect and maximize their vested interests, political relations, and economic benefits
r.^1,
^fafes As a result ofthe established need
within and around the interests ofthe Umted btates. Ab ct
r
,
IT. ●
tVipcis shall lend considerable focus to the
for and the presence oflobbying, this thesis
^ Xctatpq within the United States’ political system,
international lobbying efforts offoreign states wiinm
As the earlier allusion asserts, many

foreign countries lobby the United States’

government annually to pursue their domestic and foreign interests, to maintain their
‘'““"■“O' “"“S

poUticd .nd dipIomaUc relate,«id »
government officials. In order to

define and analyze the lobbying efforts of foreign states

within the American political system, it will be most beneficial to first outline and
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Table 1

Total Lobbying Spending
$1.44 Billion
$1,44 Billion
$1.56 Billion
$1.64 Billion
$1.81 Billion
$2.04 Billion
$2.17 Billion
$2.43 Billion
$2.62 Billion
$2,86 Billion
$3.30 Billion
$3.46 Billion

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

*

Number of Lobbyists

10,403
12,945
12,484
11,767
12,072
12,880
13,103
14,001
14,449
14,795
14,250
13,694

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

*The number of unique, registered lobbyists who have actively lobbied.

The Center for Responsive Politics - www.opensecrets.org
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describe the purpose,intentions, and mediums oflobbying efforts, both foreign and
domestic, within the United States. While the abilities and limitations between foreign
and domestic lobbying efforts remain different, the motivations for exerting lobbying
efforts transcend time, talent, and situational circumstances. The fundamental objective
of all lobbying efforts is to gain leverage and access within government.
Protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, all persons reserve the
right to petition government. Over the course ofthe nation’s history, petitioning or
lobbying governmental figures and bodies has drastically evolved into a highly
institutionalized and very lucrative establishment. As previously mentioned, billions of
dollars are spent each year in exercising this right to lobby. Since 1998,the annual
monetary resources spent on lobbying efforts have continually increased,irrespective of
the shift in partisan control, economic health, or the number ofregistered lobbyists. This
broad trend alone is a tell-tale sign that lobbying is a worthwhile venture for interests to
entertain.
Leverage and access, the indispensible golden rules oflobbying, fuel the actions
oflobbyists and interests alike. The giving and receiving ofpolitical favors, along with
the ability to leverage political and governmental officials, is extremely crucial in the
world oflobbying. In addition to gaining such imperative leverage, the ability to obtain
face-to-face interactions with top governmental officials and other influential persons
within government is absolutely invaluable. With constituents to appease, blindinglyhectic schedules to maintain, and political reputations to protect, it is simply impossible
for public officials to meet with every interest that walks through their door. Naturally,
public officials prioritize their time and their exposure. Resulting from their personal
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relationships with public officials, their ability to raise campaign contributions, and their
capacity to network,contracted lobbyists allow any and every interest the ability to gain
access and leverage regardless oftheir political standing, popularity, or reputation.
In his book. The Politics ofCongressional Elections, author Gary C. Jacobson
delineates the political and financial relationship between candidate and contributor.
Jacobson asserts,“Mobilization requires money. Congressional aspirants are wise.
indeed, to worry about the availability of money for a campaign”(Jacobson 2004,41).
Consequently, elected officials are more likely to lend exposure and act in ways that
benefit their campaign contributors, especially when contributions are secured. Jacobson
further notes,“Many interest groups contribute to campaigns not so much to influence the
outcome as to gain influence with, or at least access to, people who are likely to be in a
position to help or hurt them”(Jacobson 2004,41-42). Here Jacobson proves the
incredible importance ofleverage and access in politics that saturates not only elections,
but also the day-to-day business ofgovernment officials.
Referring to the power ofinterest and causes within the American political
system, Jacobson highlights the ability ofinterests to gain leverage and access with
political candidates. Jacobson notes that “the current electoral structure gives
representation ofa sort to any group

that can mobilize people or money to help in

campaigns”(Jacobson 2004,221). Jacobson further asserts,“The corporate political
action committees(PACs),trade associations, labor unions, and ideological groups that
supply campaign resources help to elect congenial candidates and to gain access to them;
both help to ensure that these groups’ interests are represented”(Jacobson 2004, 221).
Although Jacobson is referring to Congressional elections, this unique phenomenon is
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prevalent in all political elections, and it continues to propel and institutionalize lobbying
within the American political system.
The different types ofcampaign contributions Jacobson highlights in his book that
are utilized by domestic interests are additionally employed by foreign interests in the
American political system when applicable and legal. According to the Federal Election
Commission’s website:
The Federal Election Campaign Act(FECA)prohibits any foreign
national from contributing, donating or spending funds in connection with
any federal, state, or local election in the United States, either directly or
indirectly. It is also unlawful to help foreign nationals violate that ban or
to solicit, receive or accept contributions or donations from them. Persons
who knowingly and willfully engage in these activities may be subject to
fines and/or imprisonment(www.fec.goy).
The FEC defines a foreign national as any “foreign governments, foreign political parties,
foreign corporations, foreign associations, foreign partnerships, individuals with foreign
citizenship, and immigrants who do not have a ‘green card’”(www.fec.gov). However,
both the FEC and the Center for Responsive Politics acknowledge that some exceptions
to the law apply.
The Center for Responsive Politics and the FEC observe that “American divisions
offoreign companies can form political action committees(PACs)and collect
contributions from their American employees”provided the foreign parent corporation
refrains from financing the establishment, administration, and cost ofthe PAC,
participating in the PACs operations or

as officers, selecting the PACs operators, and

decisions regarding PAC contributions or expenditures,(www.opensecrets.org,
www.fec.gov). For the 2008 and currently for 2010 election cycles, foreign-connected
PACs have contributed $16,869,217 and $7,732,092, respectively
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(www.oDensecrets.orgV In 2008, foreign-connected PACs gave Republicans $430,217
more than Democrats,and currently in the 2010 cycle, foreign-connected PACs have
given $809,242 more to Democrats than Republicans fwvyw.opensecrets.org'). The slight
yet certain shift in partisan contributions between the two election cycles shows a unique
trend in contributions per political control. As noted earlier, Gary C. Jacobson proves the
prevalence and power directly associated with lobbying and campaign contributions
within the American political system, and this relationship enjoys a similar fi^equency and
influence within the international lobbying efforts offoreign countries, as well.
However,to protect the interests ofthe American tax-payer, the federal government,
particularly Congress, has taken measures in implementing laws to limit the power.
reach, and scope oflobbying.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 has greatly regulated the practices and
procedures utilized by agents and firms within the American political system. Registered
on
lobbyists are required by the federal government to annually disclose all fees received
hehalfof all clients represented in the previous calendar year. These disclosures divulge
the total monetary value exchanged for all services, including but not limited to, official
political representation, administrative costs and expenses, and professional consultation.
While the total financial information of a country’s lobbying efforts are available through
these disclosures, registered lobbyists are not required to specifically and extensively
itemize individual lobbying strategies and methods, which exceedingly limits the
possibility ofknowing each country’s motivations and agendas in seeking private public
policy advocacy. Although imperfect, these disclosures offer a considerable indication
ofthe extent of a country’s lobbying efforts through the private sector, which proves
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advantageous in constructing and analyzing empirical comparisons between the lobb3dng
efforts of different states.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act also includes a list ofexemptions for those
foreign principals who are not required to register with the United States Department of
Justice. However, any agent who represents a foreign government or foreign political
party must register with the United States government. These exemptions inherently
suggest that countries possessing strong diplomatic ties with the United States will prove
less apt to utilize certain means ofinfluence that require FARA registration simply
resulting from the exemption diplomats and other heads ofstate enjoy. Conversely,the
exemptions outlined by FARA also suggest that states aiming to influence Amencan
policy that lack strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. will more frequently rely upon
required registrants to exercise their goals.
Through analyzing each country’s status as an economic partner and military or
political ally, this thesis will investigate and analyze the lobbying efforts often foreign
countries within the United States from 1998 to 2010 to prove the significant differences
in allied and non-allied public policy advocacy. The first group, comprised ofChina,
Israel, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom,represent countries that possess
either military alliances or economic partnerships or both with the United States. To
control for these factors, the second group, consisting ofBrazil, Iran, Qatar, Sweden, and
Uganda represent countries that are neither military allies nor major economic partners
with the United States. Each study group represents a broad and diverse spectrum of
characteristics in terms of GDP size, international credibility, and economic strength, and
population. These economically diverse and politically varied countries allow the thesis
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to explore its main focus from a substantial array ofperspectives and dynamics by
providing a contrasting and thorough representation ofdifferent types ofrelationships in
which the United States engages with others states.
Through researching foreign governments’ registrations from 1998 to 2010, a
distinction in the level ofregistrants between different countries possessing various types
ofrelationships with the United States should become evident. When analyzing a state’s
individual relationship with the United States, a stark difference should arise between
states who are military allies and/or major economic partners in contrast to those
countries who possess neither a military alliance nor an economic partnership with the
U.S. Although the extent ofFARA’s online database pertains to all foreign principals,
including non-governmental actors as well, the thesis shall focus solely on the disclosures
offoreign governments to help explain the lobbying efforts offoreign countries and to
better understand the different types ofrelationships in which the Umted States engages
with other foreign governments.
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II.

Military Allies and Major Economic Partners
As an independent and rational actor within the international community,the

United States possesses numerous and highly diverse relationships with other foreign
countries. Resulting directly from the large influence and inherent nature ofthe U.S. as a
foreign government,the United States constantly interacts with countries of all sizes,
cultures, and political persuasions. From trading partnerships and military alliances to
diplomatic relations and financial aid contributions, the United States mamfests itself at
the center ofinternational relations. When considering its influence and situational
circumstances, it is increasingly evident that the United States seeks and maintains a
widely diversified range ofrelationships with other foreign countries. Through
identifying and analyzing the different types ofrelationships the U.S. employs to interact
with other rational actors, it is possible to understand the different mediums states employ
to meet their domestic and international goals and to understand why states lobby,
Perhaps one ofthe most easily identifiable and most resilient types of
relationships the United States maintains on

the international stage is military alliances.

Embedded deep in the nation’s history, military alliances are more prevalent today than
ever before. As a member ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO),the United
States remains one ofthe most desirable military allies in the world(www.NATO.int).
Boasting the world’s largest standing army backed by considerable military funds, the
United States possesses many strong qualities that make the U.S. a great military power.
Many countries petition the United States government for military assistance and to form
alliances every year. One might cite the free air protection the U.S. Coast Guard lends to
the Bahamas, or even Georgia’s petition for assistance during the Russian aggression
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amidst the Georgia-Russia conflict of2009(www.uscg.mil. www.nvtimes.coml. Like
Georgia and the Bahamas,the United States also seeks military support from foreign
countries to ensure success in their military endeavors and to protect its citizens against
an attack or the threat of attack on American soil. The trust and interconnectedness that
military allies enjoys certainly carries over into other domestic and international
endeavors that allies pursue.
Largely resulting from the direct exposure to and the availability oftop U.S.
government officials, and due to the presence of aligned and over-lapping national
interests between states, and mutual political and military endeavors. United States’ allies
enjoy a considerable advantage over non-allied countries through lobbying in terms of
influence and priority.
Allied states have a very clear and umque advantage over non-allied states in that
many ofthe national interests between allied states are mutually agreeable interests or, in
some instances, identical goals. Alliances satisfy the needs or desires of a state by
providing the power of numbers along similarly situated ideals or goals in moving
forward with a given national or international agenda. When the leaders oftwo or more
foreign states endeavor to pursue a

mutual interest, the need for private lobbying efforts

becomes less substantial. Direct diplomatic exposure is an elite and very effective form
in contrast to lobbying efforts exerted through the
oflobbying, and it bears preference m
private sector, Largely resulting from the nature and importance given to the
conversations between heads of state, diplomatic relations inherently express official
ideas and goals, which far surpass

the countless agendas that stream through the private

sector. The types ofjoint international ventures that occur between foreign governments
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result jfrom governmental leaders from one state lobbying governmental leaders of
another state in a direct manner to maximize the possibility ofa partnership. From war
efforts and trade agreements to embargos and financial stability, foreign states regularly
rely on the assistance of other foreign states to wield influence in the international
community and to ensure the success ofinternational endeavors that will maxunize their
domestic strength.
Potential allies may possess certain characteristics or offer security and support in
a number ofinstances that may be fulfilled through such a mutually beneficial
relationship. Possessing an untold number ofintertwined interests, an ally is far more
likely to experience success in arranging meetings with top U.S. officials. The influence
ally’s bear on American policy-makers is sure to be more persuasive and more accepted
in contrast to a non-allied state. This results directly firom the explicit exposure,joint
ventures, and aligned interests that allied states share. Whether through political or
more
military means,this thesis asserts that states allied with the United States are far
likely to utilize diplomatic lobbying efforts than non-allied states simply due to
situational advantages.
Unlike other relationships states pursue, military alliances require an inordinate
amount of political and financial obligations. During times of war, military allies are
obliged to lend military personnel and equipment at their own expense to assist the allied
country in need. Military endeavors can require millions of dollars in resources to assist
the warring allied country. Inherently, military allies assume an incredible responsibility
and amount ofpotential debt. In fact, alliances based upon military protection could be
viewed as the ultimate relationship in which two or more states may engage.
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As a member ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO),the United
States is “conunitted to defending [other] member states against aggression or the threat
of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be
considered as an attack against all” fwww.NATO.int). Not only are these agreements
substantially consequential, but these member requirements also pose an extensive
financial liability. The cost of war is no small undertaking, and the time ofattack never
considers the financial stability or economic health ofa country or government.
Although the burdens that challenge NATO members are certainly extraordinary,the
trust and dependence that the treaty establishes and offers within the 28 membercountries is utterly unparalleled. While military alliances enjoy substantial advantages,
states also benefit from economic partnerships, as well.
International trade remains a driving force in the world economy. Through
international trading, countries have the ability to purchase natural resources,
manufactured goods,and food supplies alien to their domestic landscapes and markets.
International trade helps to diversify a country’s national economy by providing the
luxury of high-quality and foreign goods. World-wide trade fuels competitive markets by
offering similar foreign commodities at a lower price, which creates a larger profit
margin. Imports and exports drive international trade. Many countries have grown
heavily dependent on the resources and goods exported by a particular country. From
natural resources and fossil fuels to foods and manufactured goods, states are constantly
trading with other states to satisfy their domestic interests and to increase their trade
profit margins.
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This dependence that states have created on foreign goods has heavily
institutionalized international trade. History has shown the evolution oftrade with the
burden oftariffs relieved by free trade agreements, allowing states to trade at much lower
costs with mutually beneficial results. One might cite the presence and effects ofthe
North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA),ratified in 1994 between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico twww.fas.usda.gov). NAFTA’s enactment created a surge of
cheaper imported goods into American markets. A similar surge within global
community is evident in China’s recently opened markets. Competitive and lucrative,
international trade motivates states to constantly interact with other states to meet their
national demands and to profit from exports.
can
Trading alliances and embargos throughout history have proven how trade
influence domestic economies with international effects. Trading partners may also use
their power ofdemand to leverage their interests with another state. One might site the
extraordinary relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States with the latter’s
dependence on the former’s vast supply offossil fuels. According to the CIA’s World
Factbook, for the 2009 fiscal year,the United States exported and imported $994.7 billion
and $1,445 trillion worth of goods, respectively(www.cia.goy). The largest rniport
partners ofthe United States for 2008 and their respective percentages include: China
16.4%, Canada 15.7%, Mexico 10.1%, Japan 6.6%,and Geimany 4.6%(www.cia.gov).
Also for 2008,the United States exported goods to the following countries Usted with
their respective percentages: Canada 20.1%, Mexico 11.7%, China 5.5%, Japan 5.1%,
Germany 4.2%, and UK 4.1% fwww.cia.goy). Among other international associations,
these figures show the thorough extent to which the United States trades with China and
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Great Britain, which validates the importance oftrading partners when leverage and
access are concerned.
When plausible and possible, this thesis will measure the effects offoreign
trading alliances and partners in their ability to wield political mfluence within the United
States. Due to the high volume ofcountries that trade with the United States, this thesis
constitutes a major trading partner as one that constitutes a sigmficant percentage of
American imports and exports from the United States’ perspective. While largely an
analytical endeavor free from lobbying disclosures and dollar amounts,the power
phenomenon associated with international trade is a very prevalent and a very lucrative
means for advocating one state’s interests in the domestic policy matters of another.
Not far from the realm oftrade, the financial standings and activities ofone
country can bear substantial effects on another country’s economy and financial system.
As was most prevalent in the recent financial crisis that stmck the United States and the
international community amidst President Obama’s first year in office, international
financial systems are extremely interrelated and interdependent on the success and
systemic health ofother major financial players. Just as the case with other fields of
influence, the power of money through investments, expenditures, loans, and
international business ventures has manifest itselfin a great position ofinfluence. A
in another country’s government or financial system
country with large financial holdings m
is far more likely to experience advantageous treatment in terms ofappropriate or
favorable policy decisions and exposure to top governmental officials due to the former’s
significant role within the country’s financial system.
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According to the Washington Post, the People’s Republic ofChina currently
owns nearly $1 out ofevery $10 dollars of U.S. public debt,” which equals
approximately $800 billion fwww.washingtonpost.com). Indisputably, China has an
enormous influence not only on the domestic economy and financial stability ofthe
United States, but they also bear influence on the chiefelected officials and policy
makers within the U.S. China owns an inordinate and unprecedented amount ofthe
United States’ debt, and this banker-lender relationship must certainly yield untold
amounts ofleverage and access to China withm the American government. While the
extent ofa country’s financial influence within the United States may be unpossible to
conceptualize and measure in empirical terms, that power is ever present and yields
incredible opportunity to exert political pressure. Regardless ofits measurable extent,
China has considerable influence on the operations ofthe United States, and because the
two countries are so financially interdependent, both states must understand and even act
in favor ofthe other country’s fiscal strength in some capacity moving forward.
Although the financial holdings within a country’s economy may prove beneficial
in wielding political influence, the presence and capacity ofa country’s gross domestic
product may also lend considerable influence to a country when lobbying the United
States. Larger economies and larger GDP figures display very attractive characteristics
and incentives for the United States to engage in trading practices, military and political
alliances, and other diplomatic relations, since that financially-viable country is more
likely to thrive as a self-sustaining rational actor. Therefore, a foreign country with a
high GDP may possess the need to petition the U.S. government on behalf oftheir
national interests. On the contrary, a country possessing a low GDP with little financial
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relevance to the United States may lack the need to lobby, or they may experience more
difficulty in their lobbying efforts.
Additionally, countries with higher GDPs are more likely to otherwise engage in
trading practices and political engagements with the United States, further promoting a
symbiotic relationship in which both countries work cooperatively on joint ventures to
achieve their domestic goals. When assessing the presence ofinternational treaty
organizations like NATO,most notably all ofthe member countries possess high GDPs
in comparison to non-member countries. This proves that countries possessing higher
GDPs are more attractive as military allies and economic partners to other countries.
Also, states with larger GDPs are more likely to otherwise engage in military and
economic endeavors, which are attributable to a country’s stability, viability, and
potential. Whereas,countries possessing lower GDPs are less likely to exhibit those
desirable traits that interest other states to form alliances, agreements, and treaties.
one
One major force that conjures up substantial international power is when
state possesses a particular good,resource, service, right, or ability that another state
desires. From natural resources and manufactured goods to political clout and financial
services, states constantly act to meet their demands by petitioning, leveraging, or
compromising with other governments. This large-scale supply-and-demand almost
automatically lends a state leverage and access with another state who demands some
good or advantage that the former controls. The severity ofleverage and access yielded
by these circumstances depends primarily on the extent of a state’s need to meet their
desires; nonetheless, leverage

and access are gained.
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As a means ofleverage, the state possessing a given desired good may utilize its
situational advantage to exert its interests in any number ofdomestic or international
endeavors in which the demanding state may be ofassistance. This umque power
phenomenon allows a state a new means ofclimbing another state s priority hierarchy
near to, if not, the top. Perhaps an oil-rich state needs assistance in obtaining a trade
agreement or in gaining membership into a military alliance. Ifa powerful state on the
international stage needs the fornier country’s oil to meet their domestic fuel demands,
then the oil-rich state might leverage its situational advantages through a mutually
beneficial exchange to meet its own goals.
Beyond the actual lobbying efforts executed by a country or interest, much
diversity exists within the types oflobbyists who carry-out these strategic agendas. A
common conceptualization of a lobbyist in the United States is an American citizen who
represents the stereotypical giants ofindustry ranging from tobacco producers and
financial services to pharmaceutical manufacturers and insurance companies. However,
foreign governments,corporations, dignitaries, and other international interests constmct
a major force in the world oflobbying. Not only are these foreign lobbyists prevalent in
the United States, but they are also increasingly powerful in the country’s domestic
affairs.
In his book. State ofDenial: Bush at War. Part III, author Bob Woodward cites
the unique relationship between former President George W.Bush and the former Saudi
Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Woodward asserts
that Prince Bandar is such a powerful figure in American politics that former President
George H.W. Bush suggested that his presidential-hopeful son meet with Bandar to
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discuss the possibility of his presidential bid before deciding to enter the race in 2000
(Woodward 2006,4). Woodward also illustrates the ever-present influence ofPrince
Bandar after Bush 41’s inauguration, as well. In the summer of2001,Prince Bandar
visited the White House bringing what he considered to be the most difScult message
ever delivered between the two countries since the beginning ofhis Washington career in
1982(Woodward 2006,75). In light ofthe United States’ actions in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia’s King expressed that he would no longer commumcate
in any form,type or shape with the U.S., and he declared Saudi Arabia’s intent to “take
all its political, economic and security decisions based on how it sees its own interest in
the region without taking into account American interests anymore because it is obvious
that the United States has taken a strategic decision adopting [Ariel] Sharon’s policy”
(Woodward 2006, 76). Bandar’s meeting with Bush was so effective that the President
not only sent the Saudi King a two-page letter outlining the United State’s position and
apologizing to the King, but he also agreed to publicly express the sentiments written in
the letter (Woodward 2006,76-77). Although the latter plans were terminated due to the
^ , u ^ 11 9001 Saudi Arabia’s political influence within the
terronst attacks on September 11, 2UU i,:>auui
f
American government is absolutely incredible. Woodward’s example proves how states
possessing high-demand resomces,goods, services, or relationships employ their
advantages to gain leverage and access in the American political system.
Apart jfrom relationships

with state’s bearing military alliances, economic

partnerships, and high-demand resources, the United States also maintains strategic
partners to facilitate specialized agendas or goals throughout the international
community. Strategic partnerships result from political or diplomatic ties, allowing the

20

U.S. to achieve a specific purpose or goal, to build a working relationship with a state, to
intervene within a state’s domestic activities, to secure support fi'om another state, or to
supplement other foreign policy efforts. Strategic partners vary in size and power across
the spectrum, but the motivations behind formmg these strategic partnerships are
compelling, as the U.S. continues to extend assistance to beneficial states. According to
the Congressional Research Service,“foreign assistance is a fimdamental component of
the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument ofU.S.
foreign policy”(CRS). The CRS notes that “there are five major categories offoreign
assistance: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and
security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid”
(CRS). Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars on foreign assistance fimds
to execute the many and diverse foreign policy goals it pmsues.
Perhaps one ofthe most prevalent strategic partnerships the Amencan
government maintains is the highly-publicized and deeply-institutionalized relationship
with Israel. For a number of years, Israel has ranked far ahead ofother states as the top
recipient offoreign assistance fimds fi^om the United States(CRS). With little military
power and a relatively low GDP,Israel’s unique relationship with the United States is
,
j
-1 j
^
<5mce the late 1970’s, Israel continues to be the
best descnbed as a strategic partnership. Mncc uic m
largest recipient offoreign assistance funds(CRS).
In their book, ne Israel Lobby,authors Steven Walt and John Mearsheimer
explain the scope, depth, power, and success ofthe ambiguous and indistinguishable proIsrael lobby within the United States. Mearsheimer and Walt note that “Israel now
receives on average about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, an amount that
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is roughly one-sixth ofAmerica’s direct foreign assistance budget and equal to about 2
percent ofIsrael’s GDP”(Mearsheimer 2007,26). The authors also highlight the
diplomatic relations between the two countries as they write,“In addition to these
tangible forms ofeconomic and military aid, the United States provides Israel with
consistent diplomatic support”(Mearsheimer 2007,40). As a strategic partner, Israel
enjoys many ofthe same benefits ofleverage and access that military allies and economic
partners experience within the American political system.
Strategic partnerships enjoy many ofthe same advantages ofother international
relationships, however,they do not bear the same obligations that war and economic
endeavors assume. In many ways,strategic partners to the United States possess the most
desirable situational affiliation among states in that they enjoy a wide spectrum of
benefits without necessarily contributing an equal amount ofresources or benefits.
Nonetheless, states like Israel serve a purpose to the United States and their international
interactions, and so they are deemed to have other means ofleverage and access separate
from lobbying with their partnered country.
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III.

Non-Allies and Non-Economic Partners
In evaluating which types ofstates lobby, it is increasingly evident and important

to discern that military allies and economic partners possess obvious vested interests
within the United States’ political system. The previous sections ofthis thesis outline in
great detail the foremost relationships the United States maintains with other countries, as
well as, the effectual obligations those relationships require ofthe participants. Through
these deliberations, it is evident that foreign states engage the United States through
numerous ways and means to achieve their domestic and international goals. Therefore,
with these considerations at hand, it is most pmdent and even more necessary to assess
the interactions between the United States and foreign governments that lack the
compelling relationships that result from heavy trade, military alliances, or other
mediums ofsubstantial intercourse.
While diplomatic exchanges and governmental dealings between powerful
governments and the United States are

both evident and predictable, history has proven

that even states who are neither allies nor major economic parmers also petition the
United States government on behalfoftheir national interests. Identical to states
possessing incredible influence within the United States, foreign countries lacking those
beneficial relationships also seek leverage and access within the American government.
Even though the United States may not deem a particular country as a cmcial ally or
detrimental trading partner, the daily undertakings ofthe U.S. government may still have
an inordinate effect on a given country’s domestic vigor and economic stability. In fact,
even the slightest fluctuation in American actions could result in the drastic improvement
or demise of a country’s GDP and economy.
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From the oil industry and the financial sector to trade practices and foreign
assistance, foreign governments petition and advocate a continuum of agendas within the
halls of Congress, within the White House, and within the many American governmental
bureaucracies in order to satisfy their national interests or strategic goals. One area in
which the American government has a lasting impact on another foreign government is
through foreign assistance funds. Awarded by the U.S. Department of State, foreign
assistance funds help foreign countries finance their government, military, or economic
endeavors(www.state.govV In some instances, these foreign assistance funds comprise a
considerable percentage ofsome countries’ GDP. Without these crucial funds, these
particular governments face an increased potential to experience financial difficulties and
issues of economic sustainability. From the United States’ perspective, however,these
funds are relatively insignificant compared to its sizeable GDP,which last year reached
$14.26 trillion according to the C.I.A.’s World Factbook(www.cia^). Therefore,
countries relying heavily on the United States to provide fundamental monetary
assistance, or any other crucial necessity upon

which the receiving country is severely

contingent, possess an incredible vested interest in the domestic policy matters ofthe
American government.
Unlike military allies and economic powers,these countries lack the ability and
resources to utilize a plethora of mediums

to exert their influence within the U.S.

government. Primarily due to their situational predicaments, these countries possessing
no major relationships with the United States must initiate and exercise alternative means
ofleverage and access within the American government. That is to say, the U.S.
government lends leverage and access

to countries that remain important to their
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economic health or systemic prosperity. For instance, the governmental leaders of Great
Britain are far more likely to experience success in arranging meetings with top
governmental leaders than states like Qatar. Similarly, the onset ofa civil war or an
overthrow of government in Uganda is much less significant and less distressing to the
United States than if said events occurred in China. These states lack the political
benefits and diplomatic relations afforded by military alliances, economic partnerships,
and trade agreements, and they are by definition less important to the overall vitality and
strength ofthe United States. Consequently,they are pressed to utilize other means of
influencing leverage and gaining access with the political leaders within the U.S.
government.
Deficient ofthese important international relationships and other means through
which they can obtain leverage and access within the American government, these states
are heavily reliant on private sector lobbying efforts to pursue their interests in the United
States’ domestic affairs. When non-allied states are incapable of employing diplomatic
connections and political relations in attempts to influence government, they retain the
expertise and accomplishments of private sector lobbyists to gain access and exposure to
top U.S. government officials and decision-makers. Boasting numerous political
connections with governmental leaders and elected officials and possessing keen political
savvy to orchestrate tangible results, private sector lobbyists offer incredible means of
leverage and access to any and every country or interest willing to recompense the
monetary worth oftheir professional services. For every country, private sector lobbying
remains a wonderful medium through which a country can exert influence and affect
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results, but for many states, private lobb3ong remains one offew and limited options in
gaining leverage and access within the American political system.
The lobbying statistics cited on pages three and four prove the lucrative nature
and associated success of private lobbying. In fact, many interests presumably view
lobbying as an investment rather than an expense, especially when noting the incredible
monetary and political advantages lobbying jnelds. Since states falling under this
category possess fewer outlets through which they may gain leverage and access with the
U.S. government,this thesis contends that states lacking strong relationships with the
United States will more frequently engage in private sector lobbying efforts than others
due to their situational differences, political disparities, and financial discrepancies.
Under this careful consideration, the selected states who fall into this category
will serve as the control group for the lobbying research. The aforementioned FARA.gov
provides an extensive database which exposes private lobbying firms and lobbyists
contracted to advise, assist, and act on behalfofrespective foreign states. The
contractual terms of agreement and price ofservices offered are clearly outlined in each
FARA registry form,allowing the thesis to better evaluate the presence and extent ofa
state’s international lobbying efforts. Through researching government lobbying
disclosures on behalfforeign governments while considering a country’s gross domestic
nor
product, the thesis will investigate the lobbying efforts ofstates who are neither allies
major economic partners as they seek to gain leverage and access within the American
political system. The research yielded by FARA disclosures for this group ofcountries
should illustrate both an increased frequency oflobbing registrations and a higher total of
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1

lobbying spending than those figures produced by the contrasting group identified in the
previous chapter.
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rv.

Analysis
Many sources were referenced in gathering information and research for the

thesis. The U.S. Department ofState’s website, www.state.gov. imparted significant
information regarding each studied country’s gross domestic product, major trading
partners,imported and exported goods, and other imperative information about the
country’s economy. Opensecrets.org highlighted major trends across the lobbying
industry,revealed the nation’s most powerful lobbying firnis fiom 1998-2009, and
disclosed the total number ofregistered lobbyists and total lobbying spending since 1998.
However,the thesis obtained the majority ofits insight and empirical data from
FARA.gov.
Through the online database, FARA.gov,the contents ofeach disclosure provide
more detailed descriptions ofprivate agents acting on behalfofforeign governments in
contrast to the aforementioned databases. The disclosure requirements outlined in FARA
are more stringent and telling than those requirements mandated by the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, primarily because FARA monitors the lobbying efforts of
foreign principals alone. FARA.gov includes letters and contracts between foreign
governments and their representative agents outlining the terms ofagreement, duration of
services, and the incurred costs ofsuch contracted services. Additionally,FARA
disclosures highlight the history and longevity offoreign principals acting within the
United States. The Federal Agent Registration Act database proves exceptionally helpful
in identifying the terms,costs, and services provided by private agents.
With the growing availability and escalating sophistication oftoday’s technology,
several official governmental and private lobbying disclosure databases are assessable via
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the internet. Providing effortless exploration and lending immediate results, these userfriendly databases offer an extensive record oflobbying disclosures. Some private
databases even monitor industry trends and draw connections within their findings.
While the formats and styles ofthese respective disclosure databases vary, the imparted
information remains unparalleled in terms ofidentifying and understanding the financial
scope and extent oflobbying efforts.
Opensecrets.org, a nonpartisan, independent and nonprofit organization powered
by the Center for Responsive Politics, along with the respective U.S. Senate and House of
Representative disclosure databases, allows an individual to search the contents ofall
lobbying disclosures through 1998. Unique to the Senate and House databases,
Opensecrets.org offers numerous avenues through which disclosure contents may be
searched, including: the names ofindividual lobbyists, firms, and clients, the total
spending by a particular industry, the interests lobbying a particular government agency,
and the lobbying of a particular issue or piece oflegislation. These databases provide
thorough and relevant information regarding a foreign country’s lobbying efforts within
the United States government. Consequently, this disclosed information creates a solid
foundation for the thesis to guide additional research and from which the thesis can draw
further conclusions about the lobbying efforts offoreign countries.
While opensecrets.org and the individual disclosure databases from the House and
Senate include domestic and international players as described by the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995,the United States Department ofJustice offers disclosure
contents based solely on the lobbying efforts offoreign countries and entities within the
American government as required under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.
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FARA “is a disclosure statute that requires persons acting as agents offoreign principals
in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure oftheir
relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in
support of those activities”(www.fara.gov'). According to the law,foreign principals are
defined as “foreign political parties, a person or organization outside the United States,
except U. S. citizens, and any entity organized under the laws ofa foreign country or
having its principal place of business in a foreign country”(www.fara.gov). However,
some foreign entities are exempt from FARA’s registration requirements, as noted on
their website:
For example, diplomats and officials offoreign governments, and their
staffs, are exempt if properly recogmzed by the U.S. State Department.
Persons whose activities are of a purely commercial nature or solely ofa
religious, scholastic, academic, scientific or fine arts nature are exempt.
Certain soliciting or collecting offunds to be used for medical aid, or for
food and clothing to relieve human suffering are also exempt. Lawyers
engaged in legal representation offoreign principals in the courts or
similar type proceedings, so long as the attorney does not try to influence
policy at the behest ofhis client, are exempt. Any agent who is engaged
in lobbying activities and is registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act
is exempt from registration under FARA ifthe representation is not on
behalf of a foreign government or foreign political party(www.fara.gov).
While these exemptions relieve many foreign principals ofregistering with the
government, for the sake ofthis thesis, these exceptions will not affect the research as all
agents acting on behalfofforeign governments or foreign political parties are required to
register. Dually noted, heads of states enjoy a great advantage in that the power and
prevalence oftheir diplomatic relations are exempt from FARA disclosures, which
underscore the numerous other means states employ to gain leverage and access.
In gathering research from the Foreign Agents Registration Act’s online database,
I searched the historical list of all foreign pnncipals, both active and terminated, from
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1998-2010. Through individually searching each country referenced within the thesis, I
compiled a list ofevery relevant governmental disclosure within the designated time
span. For every individual disclosure, the database identifies the foreign principal’s name
and address, the registration and termination dates, the registered agent’s name,and an
Adobe pdf ofthe actual registration form with any letters, contracts, or additional
documentation outlining the terms ofengagement between the foreign principal and the
registrant.
Searching through hundreds oflobbying disclosures for each country, I located
and recorded the compensation agreements outlined by the two entities. Many
disclosures described exactly the details governing each reimbursement procedure, while
others left vague the terms ofreimbursement. The majority of contracts exposed actual
numerical figures for contracted services while others specified the compensatory
procedures contingent on hourly rates and fees. Others failed to mention an exact
numerical figure associated with the registrant’s compensation for said services
altogether.
Almost universally, the contractual agreements disclosed through each
registration denoted a fixed process by which the registrant or the registrant s firm would
be reimbursed by the foreign principal for expenses related to travel, entertainment, and
other incidental costs. One such disclosure in which the contractual agreement
articulated the exact provisions ofthe compensatory provisions occurred between the
Government of Qatar and BGR Group,formerly Barbour, Griffith, & Rogers. The fees,
terms, and expenses portion ofthe contract reads:
In consideration for the services provided by BGR,the State of Qatar
agrees to pay BGR a monthly fee of$25,000 for services between
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December 1,2004, and November 30,2005. Additionally, the State of
Qatar agrees to reimburse BGR for ordinary and out-of-pocket expenses,
including items such as telecommunications services, printing,
photocopying, local transportation and other incidental expenses. BGR
will also be reimbursed for non-local transportation, meals and
entertainment; however these will be authorized by you in advance. We
envision that before we commence work on behalfofthe State of Qatar, as
well as the conclusion of our first 60-90 days of work,BGR will need to
travel to Doha(a total of at least 2-3 trips) to meet with officials fi'om the
State of Qatar for detailed consultations(www.FARA.gov).
A large percentage of the FARA disclosures pertaining to the studied countries within the
research guidelines exhibited similarly organized letters or contracts that lend an exact
monetary amount charged for services without specifying the costs of“out-of-pocket or
“incidental expenses”(www.FARA.gov). The excerpt fi:om Qatar’s agreement with
BGR gives detailed descriptions defining the parameters that expenses may entail, but the
incalculable total value of said expenses is near impossible to estimate. Although these
immeasurable figures and expenses would substantially increase the total lobbying
spending for each country within the designated time period, these figures must be
excluded from the research totals due to their anonymous nature.
Whether the registrant expressed the intent to later disclose a contract ofservices
or whether the terms of agreement between registrant and principal transcend the form of
a written contract, some registrations were noted as lacking compensation disclosures.
Since these undisclosed compensatory provisions are impossible to estimate, merely the
number ofinstances in which they occurred was recorded for each foreign country in the
associated research findings along with those disclosures in which the compensation
provisions were prescribed through hourly fees. However,some disclosures offered
actual numerical estimates for the additional expenses incurred through the lobbying
efforts, and these estimates have been included within the lobbying totals.
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While numerous disclosures indicate the exact time period and conditions ofsaid
contracted services, this thesis calculated the total monetary value ofeach country’s
lobbing efforts from 1998 to 2010. After locating and labeling each disclosure’s
individual compensation provisions for the respective countries falling within the allotted
time period, simple addition of each compensation provision produced each country’s
respective total lobbying spending from 1998 to 2010. Each foreign country, along with
their respective spending amounts, number ofregistrations, and nimiber of undisclosed
compensatory provisions, was recorded in a table according to the two previously
identified study groups - those possessing alliances and major relationships with the
United States and those that do not. [See Table 2]. The assessment ofthese monetary
values over a designated period oftime not only allows for more ease in measurement,
but the analysis ofthese lobbying efforts over a selected time interval also minimizes
errors in research, by eliminating any historical disparities in age or ability between the
different countries and the ultimate effect said factors may have on a given country s
ability to lobby.
These comprehensive research findings found on Table 2 impart exceptional
academic and empirical insight and provide a umque approach to understanding
international lobbying efforts within the American political system. Table 2 reveals the
exact spending and the number ofdisclosed and undisclosed registrations for each studied
country. The calculated figures established through researching foreign agent disclosures
on the FARA online database not only generate an empirical approximation regarding
each country’s total lobbying spending, but the frequencies of disclosed registrations and
undisclosed compensatory provisions also provide a unique and invaluable approach in

33

Table 2

Research Findings

Total Lobbying Spending
Frnm vvww.FARA.gOV

All registrations from 1998-2010.
Number of
Undisclosed/
Country

Spending

Registrations

Hourly Fees

China

$1,955,000

24

14

Israel

$1,391,000

10

4

Peru

$4,078,000

13

1

Saudi Arabia

$14,796,140.90*

28

13

United Kingdom

$1,807,681

14

5

Brazil

$1,257,354.26*

6

0

Iran

$66,000

2

0

Qatar

$3,553,650

6

1

Sweden

$60,000

2

1

Uganda

$600,000

4

1

*Exchange rates applicable for some disclosures.
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further estimating a given country’s complete lobbying efforts within the American
political system and to provide a better understanding ofthe scope and depth ofeach
study group’s lobbying practices and associated lobbying trends.
While arduous to locate, decipher, and organize the many lobbying disclosures of
the respective foreign countries, the final product ofthe research has served to enlighten
the assertions herein regarding international lobbying efforts within the American
political system while testing the factuality and strength ofthe inscribed hypothesis. The
research findings that follow are incredibly interesting and lend considerable truth within
and surrounding each country’s lobbying efforts. The most prevalent foreign agent
throughout the two different study groups, both in actual dollar amounts and the total
number of disclosure registrations, is Saudi Arabia with $14,796,140.90 and 28,
respectively. Perhaps the most telling aspect ofSaudi Arabia’s disclosures is the fact that
nearly half oftheir disclosures(13 of28)were incalculable, which shows the
extraordinary depth and profundity ofthe Saudi Arabian lobby. If it were possible to
calculate the missing disclosure amounts ofSaudi Arabia’s lobby between 1998 and
2010,their total lobbying spending would certainly increase by an incredible monetary
value.
in terms ofactual dollar spending is Pern, which
The second most dominant state m
also represents Group 1 Although the country ranked second out ofthe ten states that
.
from Saudi Arabia in total dollar amounts by
were studied, Peru remains distant iro
approximately $10.7 million. Saudi Arabia’s unparalleled spending totals establish the
Middle Eastern government as an

outlier among both groups in terms oftotal lobbying

spending. While tied for first with Iran for the least number ofregistrations, Sweden
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represents the smallest overall monetary contributor with a meager total of$60,000.
However, one of Sweden’s two disclosures reported compensatory provisions based on
hourly rates and fees. If Sweden’s undisclosed financial information were available, then
it would possibly allow the country to surpass Iran’s comprehensive total of$66,000.
The biggest lobbying spender in Group 2 was the State of Qatar with a remarkable
$3,553,650 through only six registration disclosures. Qatar represents the highest ratio
for total money spent per registration and ranks third overall in total spending. The State
of Israel recorded both the lowest total lobbying spending and the fewest number of
registrations for Group 1 with $1,391,000 and 10,respectively.
Through comparing the total lobbying spending ofeach group collectively, the
thesis will most clearly identify the accurateness ofthe projected hypothesis. In addition
to disclosing the individual spending totals ofthe examined states, the research should
highlight a trend in lobbying spending within the two study groups. The research proves
that Group 1 spent a collective $24,027,821.90 on all lobbying efforts from 1998 to 2010
while Group 2 exhausted a joint total of$5,537,004.26 on all lobbying efforts during the
same period. The average total spending of all the countries in Group 1 equals
$4,805,564.38 while the average spending per country in Group 2 totals $1,107,400.85.
The average totals oflobbying expenditures for each study group from 1998 to 2010
provide a telling juxtaposition regarding the prevalence of each group s lobbying efforts.
The average lobbying spending per year for each country is as follows: China,
$162,916.67; Israel, $115,916.67; Peru,$339,833.33; Saudi Arabia, $1,233,011.74;
United Kingdom,$150,640.08; Brazil, $104,779.52; Iran, $5,500; Qatar,$296,137.50;
Sweden,$5,000; Uganda,$50,000. By assessing the average yearly spending ofeach

36

country, a more relative explanation surfaces within the research. When compared to
domestic interest, foreign countries do not necessarily spend more than American
corporations and interests. Many corporations and private interests spend millions of
dollars within one calendar year to pursue their political interests and goals. Last year
alone, AT&T,Inc. spent $14,729,673 on domestic lobbying efforts, and the National
Association of Realtors spent $19,477,000 to influence the American government
(www.Opensecrets.org). In comparison to domestic interests, corporations, and other
entities that engage in lobbying efforts, the foreign countries examined in this thesis
spend a fraction of what domestic lobbying efforts spend.
Another key aspect ofthe research findings, briefly mentioned before, occurs
within each country’s total number ofregistration disclosures. While total dollar
amounts help to show the depth ofinternational lobbying efforts, the number of
registration instances lends further knowledge and insight into the scope and breadth ofa
country’s lobbying efforts. An increased number ofregistrations for a country directly
or
translates into an increased fi:equency ofthat country seeking political representation
consultation to achieve a given domestic or international objective. Therefore, the thesis
presumes that higher registration fi-equencies are further exertions ofa foreign country s
ability to lobby with the United States. Accordingly, the lobbying efforts ofcountries
exhibiting a higher fi*equency in registration disclosures shall be interpreted as more
prevalent in comparison with countries comparing fewer instances ofregistration
disclosures.
Although varying within each group, a clear distinction arose in the total number
ofregistration quantities between the two groups. The total number ofdisclosures, the
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range of registration instances, and the average number ofregistrations per country in
Group 1 are 126,18, and 17.8, respectively. The respective numbers for Group 2 are 23,
4, and 4. Group 1 reported 123 more lobbying registrations than did Group 2, which
proves that Group 1 not only spends more money on American lobbying efforts, but they
also seek political representation far more frequently than Group 2. The average cost of
each disclosed registration(89)for Group 1 is an outstanding $269,975.53. Group 2
ironically shows the average cost ofeach disclosed registration(20)to equal
$276,850.21.
Whereas Group 2 showed only three instances in which the compensation
practices were either undisclosed or charged at an hourly rate. Group 1 yielded an
astonishing 37 registrations deemed indeterminable. This incident alone proves the
remarkable potential to further the monetary disparity between Group 1 and Group 2
provided the undisclosed compensation procedures were determinable. Saudi Arabia
spent a total of$14,796,140.90 on 28 registration disclosures, which translates to an
average of$528,433.60 per registration. Ifthis average were applied to the remainmg 13
undisclosed or incalculable registrations, Saudi Arabia’s total lobbying spending would
reach $21,665,777.70, which equals an 146% increase and further increases the total
spending disparity between Groups 1 and 2 from approximately $18.5 million to
$25,360,454.44. Ifthe same standard is applied to China’s 14 undisclosed registrations,
it would increase the country’s total spending to $3,095,416.67 from $1,955 million.
While the research data and statistics are clearly defined and sovereign (or autonomous),
an in-depth analysis ofthe research findings reveals several trends across groups and
through other discriminatory factors that yield valuable conclusions.
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With a spending disparity of nearly $18.5 million between Groups 1 and 2, much
can le2imed from the stark differences in the lobbying efforts between those countries
possessing special relationships with the United States and those that do not. [See Table
2]. Group 1 spent well over four times as much money as Group 2 on their American
lobbying efforts, and Group 1 had nearly five times the amount ofregistration disclosmes
as did Group 2. These statistics overwhelming show that Group 1, which is composed of
countries who possess strong relationships with the United States, exerts an inordinate
amount of private sector lobbying efforts within the American political system, especially
when compared with the lobbying efforts of Group 2. hi reviewing accurate research
values and group-wide statistical averages and through juxtaposing the research findings
under different discriminatory lights, it is assiduously obvious that states possessing
military alliances, economic partnerships, or other major relationships with the United
States exert a substantially larger number oflobbying efforts over countries lacking those
beneficial relationships.
The research proves that countries falling within Group 1 not only spend a higher
average of money on lobbying,but they also boast a superior frequency in lobbying
registrations. Consequently,the lobbying efforts exerted by Group

1 are far more

prevalent and evident than the efforts put forth by Group 2. The statistics shown on
Table 2 clearly differentiate the volume oflobbying efforts between the foreign countries
of both Groups 1 and 2. Especially when considering the extraordinary amount of
undisclosed or indeterminable foreign registrations, the lobbying efforts of states falling
within Group 1 are presumably vaster in scope simply due to the drastically lower ratio of
average spending per registration. Only one country fi*om Group 2,the State of Qatar,
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1

spent more money than the smallest total lobbying spender in Group 1. However, Qatar
could definitely be deemed an outlier, as the country ranks third overall in total lobbying
spending.
While the lobbying expenditures of Group 2 from 1998 to 2010 range from

as

little as $60,000 to over $3.5 million, each country spent an average of$1,107,400.85
over the twelve-year span, which equals a meager $92,283.40, annually. These figures,
along with the actual results produced by searching through FARA’s online database,
demonstrate the numerical inferiority and relative insignificance of Group 2 s lobbying
efforts within the American political system. Although private sector lobbying presents
an incredible opportunity to obtain leverage and access within the American government,
especially for countries lacking strong, beneficial relationships with the U.S.,the
presented data regarding Group 2 illustrates the nominal lobbying efforts by the affiliated
countries.
Perhaps one explanation for these low figures pertains to the limited number of
lobbying registrations across Group 2. From 1998 to 2010,the most recorded registration
instances for an individual country was only six disclosures. The high spending per
registration ratio characteristic ofGroup 2 might explicate the strategic and detailed
nature in which and for which these foreign countries lobby. Most ofthe countries that
comprise Group 2 possess lower GDPs in comparison to the rest ofthe exammed states;
therefore, the strategic lobbying efforts executed by countries within Group 2 may
advocate or interrupt a specific policy or legislative agenda that, although financially
substantial to the petitioning state, could prove seemingly meaningless or inconsequential
to the United States. Thus, a given country’s national or international objectives sought
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through private lobbying efforts may be achieved without inciting attention or disruption
yet while greatly affecting the economic prosperity or stability ofthe state, nonetheless.
Another factor that may be considered when analyzing a particular state’s
lobbying efforts is the choice oftheir lobbying firm. The selection ofa lobbyist or
lobbying firms remains very similar to choosing legal advice or health-care in that clients
seek the absolute best they can afford. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the
world of lobbying, and it serves as the main driving force in what is a highly competitive
and extraordinarily convoluted industry. Many lobbying firms act under a certain
political persuasion or predominately focus their efforts within certain practice areas
while others aim their influence toward a certain branch of government or through
lobbying specific bureaucracies and governmental agencies. Regardless ofa state s
motivations for exercising the right to lobby,these characteristics further identify the
extent of a given state’s lobbying efforts within the U.S.
In an article from NPR entitled,“Lobbying Giants Cash In On Health Overhaul,”
authors Joe Eaton, M.B. Pell, and Aaron Mehta discuss the importance oflobbying firms
in the recent success ofthe health care overhaul. The authors explain how “many top
companies and organizations hired more than one ofthe top firms to lobby their
interests. citing firms like Patton Boggs and Holland & Knight(y^.npr.org). The
article also mentions how “in addition to direct lobbying, some ofthe top firms also
reward members of Congress with campaign contributions fimneled through the firms’
political action committees, and by individual lobbyist donations (www.npr.org). This
article reinforces the previously cited assertions of Gary C. Jacobson in his book, The
Politics ofCongressional Elections, as he explains the pivotal trend of private interests
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and lobbyists securing campaign funds to gain leverage and access with political
candidates. The recent health-care overhaul is a most recent testament to the abilities and
effectiveness of lobbyists, and the same principles, affects, and practices apply within the
American lobbying endeavors offoreign states.
The Center for Responsive Politics provides a Ust ofthe top U.S. lobbying firms

across

the board fi-om 1998 to 2009. Based solely on the total number offees incurred over this
time period, the actual numbers on the list ofthe top 20 lobbying firms come directly
from the Senate Office ofPublic Records(www.opensecrets.org). [See Table 3]. As of
February 1,2010,the Center For Responsive Politics’ most recent publication ofthe list.
the top five lobbying firms in the country are Patton Boggs; Cassidy & Associates; AMn,
Gump,Strass, Hauer & Feld; Van Scoyoc Associates, and Williams & Jensen
fwww.onensecrets.oral. While lending a comprehensive total ofall fees incurred by each
firm,the list excludes certain factors, such as a firm’s political persuasion, number of
.
,..„„.«pntation ofsuccess rates. The lobbying disclosures
members, practice areas, or any represeniau
Utilized by Opensecrets.org to calculate the list ofthe top 20 firms considers only the
,through understanding the top lobbying
lobbying efforts ofdomestic interests. However
...cnprtive it is dually noted that foreign countries
firms from the American domestic perspective,
will trust and utilize American perspectives

ofthe lobbying industry to establish and

secure the best representation available.
Out ofthe total number ofdisclosed registrations from both study groups, there
iffn country contracted one ofthe nation’s top 20 lobbying
are 12 instances in which a foreign
firms. The notorious lobbying giants

Patton Boggs and Hogan & Hartson both had a total

offour foreign registrations Akin, Gump,Strass, Hauer,& Feld; Holland & Knight;
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Table 3

Top Lobbying Firms
All Years 1998-2009
Total

Lobbying Firm
Patton Boggs LLP

$352,832,000

Cassidy & Assoc

$305,465,000

Akin, Gump et al
Van Scovoc Assoc

$287,305,000
$232,423,000

Williams & Jensen

$169,164,000

Hogan & Hartson

$154,683,907

Ernst & Young

$146,935,237

Quinn Gillespie & Assoc $134,443,500
Holland & Knight
$118,369,544
Greenberg Traurig LLP

$116,678,249

$115,950,578
PMA Group
Barbour. Griffith & Rogers $114,680,000
Dutko Worldwide
$103,206,766
PriceWaterhouseCoopers $99,734,084
Alcalde & Fay

$97,130,660

Carmen Group

$95,415,000

Vemer. Liipfert et al
Clark & Weinstock

$88,595,000
$86,885,000

Brownstein. Hyatt et al
Ferguson Group

$85,295,000
$83,762,291

NOTE: All lobbying expenditures on this page come from the Senate Office ofPublic
Records. Data for the most recent year was downloaded on February 01,2010.

Center for Responsive Politics- www.opensecrets.org
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Van Scoyoc Associates; and Barbour, Griffith,& Rogers all reported one disclosed
registration with a foreign country. Perhaps one ofthe most interesting conclusions
drawn from the contracting oftop lobbying firms is that all ofthe top five total lobbying
spenders across the two study groups contracted at least two registrations with a top 20
firm. Saudi Arabia revealed three instances in which the state contracted a top 20
lobbying firm, and Peru, Qatar, China, and the United Kingdom all possessed a total of
two registrations with one ofthe nation’s top 20 lobbying firms. The five smallest
lobbying spenders, Sweden,Iran, Uganda,Israel, and Brazil, revealed no disclosed
registrations with any ofthe top firms. Actual dollar amounts may commumcate much
information concerning a state’s lobb)dng ventures; however,the selection ofa prominent
lobbying firm provides a more pointed approach through which the political endeavors of
a state may be viewed. The more power or success a given firm enjoys allows the firm to
presumably charge a higher rate for contracted services, which might suggest the
importance of a certain political agenda or outcome.
Through analyzing the American lobbying efforts often foreign countries, this
thesis contends that states possessing military alliances and major economic relationships
with the United States sparingly engage in private lobbying due to the leverage and
access afforded by their diplomatic ties and explicit exposure to top U.S. government
officials. The thesis also maintains that foreign states lacking these beneficial
relationships with the United States rely more heavily on private lobbying efforts to gain
the leverage and access necessary to protect their national and international goals within
the American political system. Resulting from the diplomatic relations and the deep
interconnectivity between the United States and its major partners, one might presume
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that the need for private lobbying is non-existent. Military allies possess obvious vested
interests in the vitality and prosperity oftheir allies, and economic partners have large
fiscal interests in the economic strength and stability oftheir partnering state.
Conversely, states that lack major relationships with the United States will more
frequently utilize private lobbying as a means ofobtaining leverage and access within the
American government. With limited diplomatic exposure and little financial or military
significance, these non-allied coimtries must find alternative mediums through which
they may exert and pursue their national and international interests, and private lobbying
offers an effective and attainable means through which a foreign state may petition and
politically interact with the American government. However,the research proves the
opposite ofthis contention true. In fact, the findings show that states possessing major
relationships with the United States more frequently engage in private lobbying efforts in
comparison to states that lack those beneficial relationships.
Although the data and research prove the hypothesis herein incorrect, there still
exist alternative theories not previously discussed that may help explain the findings and
the trends revealed in this process. The first explanation argues that the foreign states
that possess major economic, diplomatic, or military relationships with the United States
lobby to maintain the status quo ofthe political, economic, or military interests and
interactions between the two countries. In addition to the diplomatic and political
benefits resulting from their major relationships with the United States, coxmtries like
those comprising Group 1 also engage private sector lobbying to reinforce, protect, and
preserve their current state ofinteractions with the United States. Whether securing the
equal amoimt offoreign assistance for the next fiscal year, renegotiating a trade
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agreement nearing expiration, ensuring the continuation ofcurrent military support, or
maintaining their public image within the United States government, countries possessing
strong ties with the United States utilize private sector lobbying to supplement the
endeavors and interests exerted by heads ofstate and other governmental bodies. The
increased involvement and enhanced interconnectivity between states also entails
proliferated dependence and reliance on the daily operations and actions taken by the
partnering country. Foreign states deeply intercormected with the United States hold
vested interests in the U.S. government, and these states accept a great potential of
vulnerability when it comes to the actions and decisions implemented by the U.S.
government. Therefore, states employ supplementary lobbying efforts within the private
sector to further advance their national and international interests within the American
political system.
While major U.S. partners seek private lobbying to maintain the status quo of
their interactions with the United States, coimtries with smaller GDPs utilize private
lobbying as a means of obtaining their domestic goals without engaging the government
through diplomatic, economic, or military means. The majority ofthe countries falling
within Group 2 possess lower GDPs compared to the remaining register ofstudied
countries, and as such, the scope and substantiality oftheir domestic interests are more
limited and bear less affect on the United States government. Directly resulting from the
decreased level ofimportance that the fruition ofthese petitioned interests might have on
the United States, countries like those in Group 2 are able to achieve their domestic
interests through nominal private lobbying efforts. For instance, the United States is
Peru’s number one trading partner, even though Peru is of minimal importance from the
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United States’ trade perspective. In 2008, the U.S. comprised 18.9% and 18.6% ofPeru’s
imports and exports, respectively(www.state.gov). Although seemingly unimportant to
the United States, Peru maintains the ability to contract private lobbyists to protect their
trading interests by working to prevent an increase on tariffs or through advocating a
temporary or long-term trade agreement without ever needing to consult the President
and other U.S. heads of states. Peru’s domestic and foreign policy goals are yet satisfied,
and the leverage and access obtained by the state through the process maintains a low risk
for possible negative public exposure regarding Peru and for potentially harsh criticisms
of U.S. governmental leaders. Therefore, through nominal private sector lobbying
efforts, countries possessing lower GDPs may efficiently and effectively obtain their
domestic and international interests.
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V.

Conclusion
The international community is one filled with an extensive global trading system

and a highly pervasive political and military stmcture. Resulting from the increased
interconnectivity of states and the persistent interactions among foreign countries, states
are both intrigued by and dependent upon many ofthe domestic policy matters ofother
international players. Therefore, the need for states to petition other foreign governments
on behalf of their ovm national and international interests becomes a prevalent institution
in the realm of international relations.
After researching and analyzing the American lobbying efforts often foreign
countries, based on their status ofeither possessing a military alliance or a major
economic or political relationship with the United States or those states lacking such
Strong associations, it is evident that while virtually every foreign country lobbies the
United States govermnent,several trends emerge that help explain why different types of
countries lobby the American goverrunent. Although the original contention argues that
countries lacking strong, beneficial relationships with the United States will more
frequently exert private lobbying efforts to

achieve leverage and access with the

American government, the research findings prove
ties to the United States utilize private lobbjdng

that countries possessing those strong

as a means ofleverage and access

overwhelmingly more than those coimtries not closely correlated with the U.S.
The findings do not necessarily negate
thesis, but instead, it shows that even more

the contentions established within the

research and consideration must follow.

Alternate theories exist attempting to explain why various types of states lobby the
United States. One might suggest that major economic partners and military allies may
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lobby the American government to protect their interests by maintaining the status quo of
any number ofinteractions and dealings between the two countries, or another might
insist that countries possessing smaller GDPs require only minimal private lobbying
efforts to achieve their national and international goals within the American political
system due to their proportional differences in wealth,trade volume, or any number of
considerations. There are countless approaches to analyzing and understanding why
states lobby the U.S., and this thesis verifies this notion.
Leverage and access are the hallmarks oflobbying. The ability to wield political
influence with and gain direct exposure to the top governmental leaders ofa country
establish private lobbying as a viable, productive, and fiscally-efScient means of
advocating a particular interest or idea. Lobbying is one ofthe greatest and most
complex phenomena within the American political system today. The thesis shows how
the private lobbying sector is utilized by national and, especially, international players to
advocate their interests within U.S. domestic policy and governmental matters.
Constantly evolving and increasingly appealing, the lobbying profession continues to
infiltrate and influence the decisions, actions, and consequences ofthe United States
government, and the extent to which foreign states understand and participate within this
conundrum is, and will continue to be, utterly interesting.
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Exhibit A

U.S.Department of Justice
Washington,DC 20530

To Registration Statement
Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,as amended

Privacy Act Statement. Every registration statement, short form registration statement,supplemental statement, exhibit,amendment,copy ofinformational
materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination,inspection and cq)ying
during the posted business hours ofthe Registration Unit in Washington,DC. One copy ofevery such document,other than informational materials, is
automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b)ofthe Act,and copies ofany and all documents are routinely made available to other
agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c)ofthe Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi«annual report to Congress on the
Administration ofthe Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent This rqwrt is available to the
public.
Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection ofinformation is estimated to average .49 hours per response,including the time for
reviewing instmetions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection ofinfonnation.
Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection ofinformation,including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief,
Registration Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington,DC 20S30;and to the Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,DC 20503.
Furnish this exhibitfor EACHforeign principal listed in an initialstatement
andfor EACH additionalforeign principal acquired subsequently.
1. Name and address of registrant

2. Registration No.

Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC(formerly Barbour Griffith & Rogers,Inc.)
1275 Pennsylvania Ave., NW- 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20004
3. Name offoreign principal

5430

4. Principal address offoreign principal

State ofQatar

Embassy ofthe State ofQatar
4200 Wisconsin Avenue,NW
Washington,DC 20016

5. Indicate whether your foreign principal is one of the following:

o
3

0 Foreign government
■}
■\

!

D Foreign political party
j;-.

D Foreign or domestic organization: If either, check one ofthe following:
□ Partnership

D Committee

|~| Corporation

□ Voluntaiy group

D Association

□ Other (specify):

D Individual-State nationality
6. If the foreign principal is a foreign government, state:
a) Branch or agency represented by the registrant.
The Embassy of the State of Qatar
b) Name and title of official with whom registrant deals.
H.E. Bader Omar A1 Dafa, Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary
7. If the foreign principal is a foreign political party, state:
a) Principal address.
N/A
b) Name and title of official with whom registrant deals.
N/A
c) Principal aim.
N/A
Formerly OBD-67

FOlul CRM-157
JUNE 1998

8. Ifthe foreign principal is not a foreign government or a foreign political party,
a) State the nature of the business or activity ofthis foreign principal
N/A

b) Is this foreign principal
Supervised by a foreign government,foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

Owned by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

Directed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

Controlled by a foreign government,foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

Financed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

Subsidized in part by a foreign government,foreign political party, or other foreign principal

Yes □

No □

9. Explain fully all items answered "Yes" in Item 8(b). (If additional space is needed, a JuH insert page must be used.)
.

N/A

10. If the foreign principal is an organization and is not owned or controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party or other foreign
principal, state who owns and controls it.
N/A

I

Date of Exhibit A

Name and Title
G.O. Griffith, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer

Sii

U^.Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

OMBNO.II0»007

Exhibit B
To Registration Statement
Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,as amended

INSTRUCTIONS: A registrant must furnish as an Exhibit B cc^ies ofeach written agreement and the terms and conditions ofeach oral agreement with his
foreign principal, including all modifications ofsuch agreements,or, where no contract exists,a full statement ofall the circumstances by reason ofwhich the
registrant is acting as an agent of a foreign principal, One origin^ and two legible photocopies ofthis form shall be filed for each foreign principal named in
the registration statement and must be signed by or on behalfofthe registrant
Privacy Act Statement. Every registration statement,short form registration statement,supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment copy ofinformational
materials or other document or information filed with the AUomey General under this Act is a public record open to public examination,inspection and
copymg during the posted business hours ofthe Registration Unit in Washington,DC. One copy ofevery such document other than informational materials,
is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b)ofthe Act mid copies ofany and ail documents are routinely made available to
other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c)ofthe Act. The Attorney General dso transmits a semi-annual report to Congress mi die
Administration ofthe Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent. This report is available to the
public.
Public Reporting Burden. Public reporting burden for this collection ofinformation is estimated to average 33 hours per response,including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining tfie data needed,and completing and reviewing tiie collection ofinformation.
Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect ofthis collection ofinformation, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Chief,
Registration Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington,DC 20S30;and to the Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affiurs, Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,DC 20503.
1. Name of Registrant
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC
(formerly Barbour Griffith & Rogers,Inc.)

2. Registration No.
5430

3. Name of Foreign Principal
State ofQatar

Check Appropriate Boxes:
●..:i

4. S) The agreement between the registrant and the above-named foreign principal is a formal written contract. If thisbox.i^checked, attach
a copy of the contract to this exhibit.
: ● —
5. □ There is no formal written contract between the registrant and the foreign principal. The agreement with the above-npaed foreign
principal has resulted from an exchange of correspondence. If this box is checked, attach a copy of all pertinent corres^ndriiee, including a
copy of any initial proposal which has been adopted by reference in such correspondence.
6. D The agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal is the result of neither a formal ^tteacontract nor an
exchange of correspondence between the parties. If this box is checked, give a complete description below of the terms'Shd conditions of the
oral agreement or understanding, its duration, the fees and expenses, if any, to be received.

7. Describe fully the nature and method of performance of the above indicated agreement or understanding.
The nature and method of performance of the contract between the Registrant and the Principal will include arranging meetings with
Executive and Legislative Branch officials and advising the Principal with regard to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

Formerly OBD-65

IORi4CRM-15i
JUNE 1998

8. Describe fully the activities the registrant engages in or proposes to engage in on behalfofthe above foreign principal.
1. Developing, refining and expanding relationships between Qatari officials and the U.S.foreign policymaking apparatus in the Executive
and Lepslative Branches of the U.S. Government.
2. Establishing a policy dialogue between Qatari officials and private-sector U.S. foreign policy intellectuals on issues ofbilateral
importance to Qatar and the United States.

9. Will the activities on behalf ofthe above forei^ principal include political activities as defined in Section l(o)ofthe Act and in the
footnote below?
Yes CS
No U
If yes,describe all such political activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be influenced together with
the means to be employed to achieve this purpose.
1. Arrange meetings between Principal officials and policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches.

Date of Exhibit B

Name and Title

Sij

G.O. Griffith, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer
.the VM intends to, in any way influence
Footnote: Political activity as defined in Section 1(o)ofthe Act means any activity which the person engaging in believes'
to
any agency or ofTicial ofthe Govenunent of the United States or any section ofthe public within the United States
ing, adopting,or changing the
re
ofa government ofa foreign country or a foreign political
domestic or foreign policies ofthe United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or le
party.

Barboxjr Griffith &Rogbrs,ixc
November 22,2004
His Excellency Bader Omar A1 Dafe
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary
Embassy ofthe State of Qatar
4200 Wisconsin Avenue,NW
Washington, D.C. 20016
Dear Mr. Ambassador,
We are delighted that the State ofQatar has agreed to retain Barbour Griffith &Rogers,LLC
(BGR). Pursuant to our earlier discussion, please accept this letter ofagreement to work on your
behalf

I

Scone of Work: Our representation will encompass providing strategic counsel and tactical
plaiming on foreign policy matters before the U.S. Government.
Fees.Terms & Expenses:In consideration for the services provided by BGR,the State ofQatar
agrees to pay BGR a monthly fee of$25,000 for services between December 1,2004,and
November 30,2005.
Additionally, the State of Qatar agrees to reimburse BGR for ordinary and out-of-pocket
expenses,including items such as telecommunications services, printing, photocopying, local
transportation and other incidental expenses. BGR will also be reimbursed for non-local
transportation, meals and entertainment; however these will be authorized by you in advance.
I

We envision that before we commence work on behalfofthe State ofQatar, as well as at the
conclusion ofour first 60-90 days of work,BGR will need to travel to DoU(a total ofat least i3 trips)to meet with officials finm the State of Qatar for detailed consultations.
Invoicing: Professional fees and expenses are invoiced separately:
1. Professional Fees: BGR will invoice the State ofQate on the first day o^h month for
professional fees in advance ofthe coming month,starting December 1,2004.
2. Expenses: BGR will invoice the State of Qatar on the last day ofeach month for expenses
incuned during the month prior, starting December 31,2004.
Regardless ofthe ultimate duration ofthe Agreement, all invoices generated from the terms and
between the two parties to this agreement are payable in-fiill and promptly upon receipt and shall
be paid directly to BGR.
Renewal & Extension: BGR and the State ofQatar acknowledge at the outset oftheir
relationship, that both parties envision this Agreement will need to be renewed beyond the
twelve-month(12)period enumerated in this document. Accordingly, this Agreement maybe
Tenth Floor
Pennsylvania
Avenue NW
1375
Washington,DC 30004
Tel (303)333 493<S * FAX (l02)833-939a
WWW.BGRDC.COM

Barbour Griffith&Rogers,llc
renewed and extended upon notice ofa desire to do so by either BGR or the State ofQatar,and
upon the written agreement ofboth. Terms and Scope ofWork will remain materially and
substantially the exact same as before, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing.
Termination & Cancellation: Either BGR or the State ofQatar will be able to terminate the
agreement for any reason upon thirty(30)days written notice, with no further obligation, other
than to pay such fees and expenses that would have accrued iqj to and through the 30-day notice
period.
Confidentiality: BGR recognizes that in the course ofour representation, we could become
aware ofinformation, practices or policies, which you wish kq>t confidential. BGR agim to
maintain that confidentiality and will not disclose to any outside party the information either
during the period ofa contract or afterwards, to the extent permitted by law.
Entire Understanding: This Agreement contains the entire understanding between the parties.
Amendment, modification or waiver ofthis agreement may be accomplished with a written
instrument signed by both parties.
Please sign both copies ofthis agreement and return one to us. We are looking forward to a long
and productive relationship with the State of Qatar and we are eager to start working on your
behalf.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC

Embassy ofthe State ofQatar

Ed Rogers
Chairman

H.E.Bader Omar AI Dafa
Ambassador Extraordinary &
Plenipotentiary

Date:

Date:

I

U /vh-I.p.H-

